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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of the state for an effective engagement of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the OECD context, the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the state is considered an important incentive for MNCs to 
engage in CSR activities that contribute to governance. However, in areas of limited 
statehood, where state actors are too weak to effectively set and enforce collectively binding 
rules, profit-driven MNCs confront various dilemmas with respect to costly CSR standards. 
The lack of a credible regulatory threat by state agencies is therefore often associated with the 
exploitation of resources and people by MNCs, rather than with business’ social conduct. 
However, in this paper we argue that there are alternatives to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ that 
induce MNCs to adopt and implement CSR policies that contribute to governance in areas of 
limited statehood. We then discuss that in certain areas such functional equivalents still 
depend on some state intervention to be effective, in particular when firms are immune to 
reputational concerns and in complex-task areas that require the involvement of several actors 
in the provision of collective goods. Finally, we discuss the ‘dark side’ of the state and show 
that the state can also have negative effects on the CSR engagement of MNCs. We illustrate 
the different ways in which statehood and the absence thereof affect CSR activities of MNCs 
in South Africa and conclude with some considerations on the conditions under which 
statehood exerts these effects. 
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 The paper draws on findings of a four-year collaborative research project “Business and Governance in South 
Africa”, conducted in the Collaborative Research Center (SFB 700) “Governance in Areas of Limited 
Statehood” (cf. http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/index.html). 
Introduction 
 
In an increasingly globalized economy, multinational companies 
(MNCs) are assumed to escape strict national regulation by relocating their 
production sites to areas of limited statehood where regulation is low and 
enforcement is weak. This behavior drives states into a ‘race to the bottom’, 
leading to the degradation of natural resources and the compromising of 
social standards for the sake of economic growth or short-term foreign 
investment (Chan and Ross 2003, Kaufmann and Segura-Ubiergo 2001, 
Lofdahl 2002, Rudra 2002). At the same time, however, companies have been 
“drawn into playing public roles to compensate for governance gaps and 
governance failures at global and national levels” (Ruggie 2004: 13; cf. 
Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Bierstecker 2002; Flohr et al. 2010, Haufler 2001; 
Pattberg 2006). Empirical evidence abounds on companies which voluntarily 
commit themselves to social and environmental standards and adopt private 
self-regulatory regimes – even in the absence of a regulatory threat by the 
state (Vogel and Kagan 2004; Mol 2001, Flanagan 2006; Risse 2011). Studies 
show, e.g., that foreign direct investments originating from a  country with 
high levels of self-regulation unleash norm-diffusion dynamics among 
competitor firms that in turn lead to higher levels of business self-regulation 
in the weakly regulating host country, i.e. where the investments are made 
(Prakash and Potoski 2007; Greenhill et al. 2009). Also, exporting to a highly 
regulating country creates a surge for higher standards in low-regulating 
countries (Greenhill, et al. 2009).  
 
These studies leave no doubt that companies can contribute to the 
provision of common goods and services, which we term ‘governance’. What 
remains open and will be explored in this article are the conditions under 
which companies are in fact willing to provide such governance 
contributions, channelled through their corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities in areas of limited statehood. How does statehood and the absence 
thereof affect whether companies effectively contribute to collective goods 
provision? We define governance as the crafting and implementation of 
collectively binding norms and rules for the provision of common goods or 
the provision of common goods itself (Risse 2011; Börzel and Risse 2010). 
 
This article suggests, firstly, that it does not always take the threat of 
state regulation, elsewhere depicted as the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 
1997; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008), to make MNCs engage in CSR that 
contributes to governance. Rather, we identify alternatives or ‘functional 
equivalents’ (Draude 2007; Börzel and Risse 2010) to the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’. By functional equivalents this article understands factors other 
than the threat of state regulation that generate incentives, positive and 
negative, for MNCs to engage in forms of CSR that contribute to governance. 
We consider in particular the following factors: market incentives, 
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reputational concerns and public pressure, the ‘shadow of anarchy’ (see 
Scharpf and Mayntz 1995), defined by the absence of any state involvement 
in the provision of common goods, and an external ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast 
by home states of MNCs and by international organisations.  
  
Secondly, we discuss which CSR activities may still require the 
involvement of the state and, thus, a certain amount of state capacity to set 
and enforce regulations and to provide basic infrastructures in order to 
effectively contribute to governance. To what extent do functional 
equivalents to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ still depend on a minimum of 
statehood to make MNCs engage in CSR that effectively contributes to e 
governance? Do different degrees of statehood give rise to different forms of 
CSR governance contributions? We argue that there are two conditions under 
which statehood is still relevant: First, a degree of state capacity is necessary 
to make companies, that are immune to reputational concerns, contribute to 
CSR. Second, complex-task CSR activities require the co-production of 
governance with the state.  
 
Having dealt with statehood as positively related to business’ CSR 
engagement that contributes to governance, we turn the perspective and 
discuss, thirdly, potential ‘dark sides’ of the state. Despite limited capacities, 
states can discourage or undermine the provision of common goods by MNCs 
in areas of limited statehood: state actors can engage firms in exclusive 
governance arrangements that result in club goods benefitting only privileged 
individuals or groups closely related to the state. Such ‘patrimonial collusion’ 
(Handley 2008; Hönke forthcoming-b) is the opposite of inclusive 
governance arrangements. Inclusive governance is concerned with the 
reduction of negative externalities and the contribution to the provision of 
open-access goods. Our third argument thus emphasises that although state 
capacities are necessary to make companies engage in CSR in some areas, 
state capacities – limited as they may be – can also negatively affect firms’ 
attempts to contribute to governance. 
 
The article starts with a definition of key concepts. We then outline 
how functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ induce CSR 
activities of MNCs that contribute to governance in areas of limited 
statehood. The subsequent sections discuss the ambivalent role of the state, 
limited as its capacities might be, as both a facilitator and inhibitor of CSR 
governance contributions. Finally, we present empirical case studies which 
illuminate the different ways in which statehood and the absence thereof 
affect CSR activities of MNCs in areas of limited statehood. Empirically, we 
draw on extensive research on corporate engagement in governance in South 
Africa. Areas of limited statehood are widespread in South Africa and the 
capacity of the South African state to set and, particularly, to enforce binding 
regulation is weak, especially at the local level. South Africa thus provides a 
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context to explore what difference limited statehood makes to the CSR 
engagement of MNCs that contribute to governance. The article concludes 
with a short summary of our main arguments and some considerations of 
potential scope conditions for the causal relevance of statehood. 
 
The CSR engagement of MNCs and governance in areas of limited 
statehood 
 
While the engagement of MNCs in CSR is well understood, research 
on their governance contributions in so called ‘areas of limited statehood’ is 
still emerging. We define areas of limited statehood as areas in which 
government lacks the capacity to set and implement collectively binding rules 
and to provide collective goods (Risse 2011; Börzel and Risse 2010). This 
lack reduces the ability of government to cast a credible ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’, by which we understand the threat of government to enforce 
regulation in an issue area or industry (Scharpf 1997, Héritier and Lehmkuhl 
2008). A prerequisite for an effective ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is the capacity of 
the state to hierarchically impose collectively binding rules, for which 
sufficient financial and material resources, personnel, and expertise are 
essential. Many governments are not capable to either set or enforce 
legislation at the domestic level. Notorious examples of areas of limited 
statehood are the favelas in Latin America, the townships of Africa, the 
‘special economic zones’ in Asia, or secessionist regions in the Western 
Balkans, the Southern Caucasus and China. It is important to note that we 
find different areas of limited statehood within states, such as in South Africa; 
states’ capacity to set and enforce collectively binding rules and provide 
common goods can be limited in specific issue areas, such as environment, 
health, or security, and in geographical sub-regions (cf. Risse 2011). The 
concept of areas of limited statehood applied in this article avoids the 
methodological nationalism inherent in concepts of failing/failed states; it 
focuses on state capacities (statehood) rather than state territory, and 
identifies limitations in the specific functional and geographical areas in 
which MNCs operate.  
 
By governance contributions we refer to those CSR activities by 
business that help to set and implement collectively binding rules for the 
provision of common goods or the provision of common goods itself. This 
entails the reduction of negative externalities, such as environmental 
pollution, as well as direct governance contributions, e.g. the development 
and implementation of HIV/AIDS programs. While companies do not have to 
perform these latter governance functions in cooperation with state agents, the 
impact of their CSR (voluntary, self-regulatory) activities should reach 
beyond the purview of the companies to qualify as more than a private good. 
Moreover, we do not consider commitment to CSR initiatives alone but focus 
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on MNC engagement that translates into policies, institutions and resources 
dedicated to put a commitment to CSR into practice.  
 
Why should MNCs engage in types of CSR which contribute to 
governance in areas of limited statehood? Firms are not committed to the 
common good. They pursue private interests. The business of business is to 
maximize private profits, not social welfare.2 Empirically, however, we find 
that under certain conditions firms engage in CSR activities which contribute 
to governance. The literature on governance in areas of consolidated 
statehood shows that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the state is a key 
incentive in this respect. In order to avoid state regulation, firms choose 
voluntarily to commit themselves to reaching a regulatory outcome closer to 
their preferences. Moreover, the possibility of state regulation reduces the 
incentive to renege on a voluntary commitment.  
 
In those parts of the world, however, where the state’s capacities to 
regulate business behavior are weak and a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is therefore 
absent, it is far less clear what could be the motivation of firms to contribute 
to governance. Nonetheless, we do find MNCs engaging in CSR in these 
areas of limited statehood. They do not only adopt global standards to govern 
their worldwide business activities (Epstein and Roy 2007; Prakash and 
Potoski 2006, 2007) but voluntarily implement environmental protection 
standards, provide HIV/AIDS-related services, or agree to use sustainable 
energy (Flohr, et al. 2010; Börzel and Thauer forthcoming). In some 
instances, they even regulate their supply chains, and seek to foster state 
regulation by pressuring for stricter legislation and helping to strengthen the 
enforcement capacity of state actors (Börzel and Thauer forthcoming, Vogel 
and Kagan 2004). How can we explain these findings? 
 
Functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
 
We start from the assumption that (the threat of) state regulation – that 
is, a credible ‘shadow of hierarchy’ – is not necessarily a precondition for 
companies to participate in the provision of common goods. More precisely, 
we argue that functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ can make 
MNCs engage in CSR that contributes to governance in areas of limited 
statehood. The threat of state regulation is not the only way to generate 
incentives for firms to engage in the provision of common goods (cf. Börzel 
and Risse 2010). Functional equivalents can ensure that firms agree to engage 
in CSR (commitment) and do not renege on their commitment (compliance). 
Four such functional equivalents stand out. First, CSR can be a successful 
market strategy. Standards can yield economic gains by enhancing the 
                                                 
2
 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits” in: The 
New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970. 
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product quality and, as a consequence, the prospect of a more successful 
marketing of the product (Ammenberg and Hjelm 2003; Anton et al. 2004; 
Parker 2002). By incorporating environmental and social standards into their 
management systems, for instance, MNCs have been able to secure and 
expand their market shares and reduce production costs (Porter and Kramer 
2002; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Barney 1997). Competitors may follow 
suit for fear of losing market shares or because they seek to emulate their 
successful peers (Bansal 2005; Potoski and Prakash 2005; Prakash and 
Potoski 2006). We suggest that such a ‘race to the top’ (Vogel and Kagan 
2004) – a competitive dynamic leading to the adoption and spread of higher 
standards among firms – is also at work in areas of limited statehood.  
 
Second, the reputation of a company and the loyalty of its clients 
constitute a key corporate asset (Spar and LaMure 2003). This is especially 
true if companies sell to the ‘LOHA’ segment (Lifestyles of Health and 
Sustainability), i.e. to consumers that value and demand sustainable products 
and the respect of social and environmental standards and are willing to pay a 
premium for this. Such brands will gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis 
competitors if they take the lead position in their industry with respect to 
strict self-regulatory standards (Smith 2008; Auld et al. 2008; Epstein 2008). 
Conversely, a competitor in that segment which is found to blatantly neglect 
its corporate social responsibilities will lose customer loyalty and its 
reputation and, consequently, market shares (Haufler 2001; Mol 2001: 97-
100; Blanton and Blanton 2007). Moreover, obvious violations of social or 
environmental standards may provoke campaigns by transnational NGOs 
(Baron 2003; Flohr, et al. 2010; Newell 2001) and local community-based 
organizations (Eweje 2005; Lund-Thomson 2005; Bowen et al. 2008). Such 
public shaming can result in consumer boycotts, loss of reputation and market 
shares, falling stock market prices and criticism by shareholders (Wheeler 
2001; Hendry 2006; Waygood 2006). We therefore argue that companies 
under attack will seek to pacify the critics through the adoption of high self-
regulatory standards and an ostensive commitment to social responsibilities 
(Schepers 2006; Trullen and Stevenson 2006; Hoffmann 2001; Halfteck 
2008). Pressure to engage in CSR, finally, can also emanate from peers who 
are concerned that ‘one rotten egg spoils the entire cake’, i.e. the reputation of 
an industry sector (Hönke and Kranz forthcoming, Hönke forthcoming-b, 
Prakash 2005). Business associations and informal networks often act as 
transmitters of peer pressure (Kollman and Prakash 2001). The vulnerability 
of companies to these various kinds of pressures is stronger if a company has 
intra-firm investments in technology and human capital formation (Thauer 
2010, 2012) or a brand name to protect, targets a high-end market (Haufler 
2001; Mol 2001: 97-100; Blanton and Blanton 2007), has an international 
(export) orientation (Bansal and Roth 2000) or if its product is highly visible 
to end-consumers (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010). Highly visible multinational 
companies operating in areas of limited statehood, such as from extractive 
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industries for instance, are not only confronted with an alert public but also 
with a general suspicion to do bad in these areas. Engaging in CSR, even 
without having been targeted by a specific shaming campaign, is a way to 
signal good behavior to shareholders and the public (Hönke and Kranz 
forthcoming). 
 
Third, while companies operating in areas of limited statehood hardly 
face a credible ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the host state, it may be 
precisely the absence of the threat of strict(er) regulation that creates an 
incentive for companies to engage in CSR. If the state is not capable of 
setting and enforcing collectively binding decisions, companies are not 
confronted with a situation in which they have to weigh the costs of 
cooperation and voluntary commitment against the possibility of a suboptimal 
hierarchically imposed policy by the state. Rather, they face the danger of not 
having a common good at all. If the pursuit of their individual profit depends 
on the provision of certain common goods and collectively binding rules to 
produce them, respectively, and the state is not capable or unwilling to 
provide them, the ‘shadow of anarchy’ (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) provides 
companies with a major incentive to step in and fill the governance gap. Yet, 
they still confront free rider problems. Hence, instead of voluntary self-
regulation, we expect in such situations collective CSR activities in the 
context of business associations, which can mitigate the free rider problem 
through strict rules, information provision and the imposition of costs for 
non-compliance (Ronit and Schneider 2000). 
 
Finally, while the ‘shadow of anarchy’ substitutes for the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’, the latter can also be generated externally. International 
organizations and foreign governments can commit companies to the 
common good. On the one hand, under international law, MNCs can be 
obliged to comply with standards of good governance in areas of limited 
statehood (Ladwig and Rudolf 2011). On the other hand, national 
governments of (consolidated and democratic) states, where MNCs have their 
headquarters, may also force them to contribute to governance in areas of 
limited statehood. In this particular case, home country laws are in place and 
enforceable which require non-state actors such as companies to comply with 
standards of good governance or other regulations (e.g. environmental laws) 
irrespective of where they invest or act.  
 
In sum, we argue that firms may engage in CSR activities that 
contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood despite weak capacities 
of the state to set and enforce collectively binding norms and rules. The 
‘shadow of anarchy’, an external ‘shadow of hierarchy’, competitive and 
reputational costs or benefits provide incentives that are functionally 
equivalent to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the state to make MNCs adopt 
and implement CSR policies.  
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Is the state still necessary? Areas where limited statehood and governance 
collide 
 
While functional equivalents can make MNCs engage in CSR 
activities, it may still require a minimum of statehood to ensure that these 
activities really contribute to governance, particularly when it comes to 
putting voluntary commitment into practice. We submit two arguments in this 
respect. First, when firms are not much concerned about their reputation, 
pressure from consumers, peers, shareholders, or NGOs may yield hardly any 
effects on the CSR activities of MNCs. Under such circumstances, the state 
may become the addressee of advocacy networks and consumer campaigns in 
order to make it put pressure on firms to commit to CSR. We call this 
mechanism ‘invoking state authority’. Local activist groups exert pressure on 
the state to put pressure on individual companies. This may seem to 
contradict the notion of areas of limited statehood, where the state by 
definition is too weak to threaten companies with the implementation of strict 
regulation. However, while limited capacities of the state refer to the overall 
lack of ability to regulate companies systematically, state actors and resources 
do exist nonetheless. The question is on which tasks they are spent. If state 
agencies are pressured to concentrate their activities and resources on one or a 
few particular companies, these companies will have to react and give in to 
the pressure that is exerted upon them in turn. Ultimately, such a 
concentration of state activities threatens the ‘license to operate’ of the 
targeted company. Such mechanisms of ‘invoked state authority’ are also 
relevant for the external ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by consolidated states 
hosting the head quarters of MNCs – or by international organizations whose 
capacity to enforce international standards depends on the cooperation of 
consolidated states. 
 
Second, MNCs willing to abide with CSR norms and to contribute to 
governance may still be inhibited from doing so by limited statehood. The 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the state can be substituted by economic 
incentives. However, there is more to statehood than generating incentives. 
CSR activities often need to be be institutionally embedded in order to 
contribute to the provision of a common good. In other words, their effective 
implementation might depend on a functioning state structure. This is 
particularly likely in the case of complex task areas of CSR activity. Such 
tasks are interactive and tightly coupled with a number of actors and 
functional fields (Perrow 1972). Combatting HIV/AIDS is such a complex, 
context-specific issue that characterizes the non-market operational 
environment of MNCs in many Sub-Saharan countries. Workplace and 
community programs that combat the epidemic can be understood as a cross-
functional CSR engagement in the areas of human resources, health and 
development. For example, automotive firms in South Africa that invest 
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substantially in specific skills of their employees often feel inclined to 
safeguard this investment by setting up HIV/AIDS workplace programs 
(Thauer 2010, 2012). Large mining firms in South Africa dispose of a largely 
low-skill workforce, yet still engage in HIV/AIDS workplace and community 
programs. With these activities firms respond to public pressure and 
reputational concerns as well as to the costs HIV/AIDS imposes on firms in 
contexts with strong labor regulation, such as South Africa (Hönke 
forthcoming-a). Combatting HIV/AIDS effectively requires a comprehensive 
health care system that reaches out to entire families and communites in order 
to prevent infection and provide care for infected people. It is also related to 
broader social, economic and cultural factors that need to be addressed. 
Similarly, environmental standards must be set locally to be at all applicable 
for firms. If local state agencies do not issue any such regulation, MNCs face 
difficulties in asking their suppliers to adhere to the standards to which they 
have committed under their CSR engagement. Governance without 
governemnt can be, and sometimes needs to be, strengthened by governance 
by government in the same area in order to be comprehensive and effective 
See also Amengual 2010. Turning the CSR activities of MNCs into 
governance contributions often requires a basic institutional infrastructure. 
This is particularly the case where the provision of a commom good is a 
complex, ‘coupled task’ (Schäferhoff forthcoming) that relies on the 
cooperation with – or fulfillment of functions by – other actors than the 
MNCs. With respect to CSR activities that reach beyond the corporate 
purview it is often the state that is looked upon to  provide the infrastructure 
to put in place such cross-functional governance and to  provide  basic 
security or legal certainty as a precondition for contributions by firms in 
complex-task areas of CSR. By contrast, if the task is ‘decoupled’ 
(Schäferhoff forthcoming), MNCs do not require any additional state 
capacities to provide common goods. We therefore expect that the more CSR 
activities of MNCs concern a coupled task, the more it takes the state to turn 
them into governance contributions, ceteris paribus. 
 
The role of the state reconsidered – the ‘dark side’ of statehood 
 
While statehood may  often be needed for turning CSR activities of 
MNCs into governance contributions, its presence can also have the reverse 
effect. This is, however, not so much related to statehood casting a credible 
‘shadow of hierarchy’, as  to the lack of willingness on the part of state actors 
to encourage governance contributions by companies in the first place. On the 
one hand, governments in areas of limited statehood tend to lack autonomy 
from business. On the other hand, they may (ab)use their legal authority to 
impose some of their political and personal economic interests on firms. 
MNCs rely on informal political networks to receive state contracts and 
licenses in many areas of limited statehood. Companies then owe members of 
these networks personal favors (Reno 2001; Handley 2008). State actors may 
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also prevent companies from providing a particular common good and 
obstruct their CSR activities if these activities address issue areas in a way not 
supported by governemnt or opposition groups. In the sensitive area of 
security, for instance, government authorities seek to demonstrate and 
reinforce their claim to sovereignty which is inherently linked to controlling 
the use of force, by preventing companies from providing human rights 
training to the police (Hönke forthcoming-b). In South Africa, the 
government has long opposed conventional theories about HIV/AIDS and 
therefore obstructed business engagement in combating the pandemic. 
Another way of the state acting against governance contributions by firms is 
to use the law as a weapon against MNCs that pursue a politically sensitive 
agenda, as recently experienced by google in China. Hence, governments in 
areas of limited states may be too weak to cast a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ over 
MNCs to make them engage in CSR that contributes to governance. But they 
can still undermine the provision of common goods by CSR activities of 
MNCs casting a ‘reversed’ ‘shadow of hierarchy’ by ‘throwing the book of 
law’ on firms if they undermine their political power or act against their 
economic interests. Finally, state actors may refuse to provide MNCs with the 
necessary support for contributing to governance fearing ‘agency loss’ or 
‘agency capture’ because of the inferiority of their financial resources, 
personell and expertise (Stigler 1971; Hellmann et al. 2002; Börzel 2009). 
Collective goods provision by companies may in fact be perceived as 
negatively affecting the authority of the state in a particular functional field or 
region (Tsai 2011). 
 
The dark sides of statehood may be reinforced by companies that 
actively seek to use political networks to gain access to markets or favorable 
contract conditions. Such ‘neopatrimonial collusion’ (Handley 2008; Hönke 
forthcoming-b) of business and state increases the likelihoood that CSR 
activities of MNCs  take on the form of club goods limited to a political 
network. In this case, the good provided is not accessible for the general 
public or group of designated beneficiaries, but benefits those that are 
priviledged already. MNCs may find such ‘neopatrimonial collusion’ 
acceptable or even economically beneficial (Hönke 2012; Reno 2001). Yet, if 
companies are reputation-driven, it constitutes a serious economic risk. NGOs 
or the media may pick up on such practices, with potentially severe 
consequences for the brand image of the firm.  
 
To conclude, while a certain degree of statehood may be still 
necessary to make CSR activities that contribute to governance work, 
statehood can also discourage or undermine MNC efforts. This raises the 
question of scope conditions. Our findings indicate that the dark side of 
statehood is less likely to emerge if it is kept in check by institutional 
restraints (Börzel 2009; Börzel 2012). At the national level, such restraints 
can consist in an effective rule of law and institutional checks and balances on 
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government, such as democratic elections. At the local level, social cohesion can 
hold local politicians accountable and make them strive for inclusive governance 
outcomes (Tsai 2007). Local leaders are thus more likely to engage in exclusive 
governance arrangements where low social cohesion combines with weak 
accountability mechanisms. 
 
CSR and MNCs in South Africa 
 
To illustrate the different ways in which statehood and the absence 
thereof affects the ways in which the CSR engagement of MNCs contribute to 
governance in areas of limited statehood, we draw on the findings of a four-
year research project on corporate engagement in CSR in South Africa (cf. 
Börzel and Thauer forthcoming). South Africa is a newly industrializing 
country whose legal standards are fairly well developed in most policy areas, 
while the state’s capacity for implementing regulations and securing 
compliance is rather weak. The capacity of the state to cast a credible 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ is weak in various geographical areas and policy fields. 
For instance, since the mid-1990s, the South African government has 
developed ambitious and far-reaching environmental legislation in the fields 
of water, biodiversity and recently also air. While legal requirements are 
comprehensive and demanding, details pertaining to the specific behavior of 
firms are often not spelled out in detail. Moreover, overlapping 
responsibilities of several government departments lead to regulatory 
confusion, contradicting requirements and implementation gaps. Most 
importantly, the implementation of regulations is in many cases deficient 
since local state agencies lack the capacity to effectively monitor and sanction 
corporate malpractice. However, the capacity of local state authorities varies 
such that implementation and enforcement are for example much better in the 
Western Cape than in Limpopo province. Finally, compliance with 
environmental standards tends to entail significant costs, which firms are 
reluctant to bear. 
 
The situation is very different with regard to the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. South Africa belongs to the countries with the highest HIV/AIDS 
rates in the world. This makes the pandemic a highly relevant, context 
specific issue of CSR for companies operating in South Africa. With 
widespread prevalence of HIV/AIDS, firms experience an increase in 
employee turnover. Employees remain absent from work because they fall ill 
or because infected family members need to be looked after. The South 
African state has lacked both the capacity and the political will to 
comprehensively fight the disease. In the absence of public health care 
provision in this area, in particular those firms that have invested in skills of 
employees have a basic interest in contributing to overcoming this problem. 
But also firms with low-skilled labor respond to reputational challenges and 
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costs imposed by the specific South African environment with the 
establishment of extensive HIV/AIDS workplace and community programs. 
 
To inquire the role of the state and its capacity to set and enforce 
collectively binding rules for governance contributions of MNCs empirically, 
we will analyze the CSR behavior of several companies in the automotive and 
mining sectors. The automotive sector is dominated by seven international 
brands that operate production sites in South Africa: BMW, Ford, General 
Motors, Nissan-Renault, Mercedes Benz, Toyota and VW. Generally 
speaking, two to three out of these seven brands – BMW, Mercedes Benz and 
Toyota – target a premium segment of the automotive market. Ford, General 
Motors, Nissan-Renault, VW and Toyota produce cars for a middle class 
mass segment. Toyota is in many ways an exception, as its strategy is the 
most comprehensive of all automotive producers. The company strives for 
market dominance in all market segments (recent problems with production 
notwithstanding) and is thus a mass as well as premium segment producer.  
 
The South African mining sector is dominated by some of the largest 
multinational companies worldwide, including Anglo American, BHP 
Billiton and De Beers. These are followed by important large and medium-
sized companies such as Anglogold Ashanti, Goldfields, Impala Platinum and 
others. In contrast to the automotive sector, most of these companies are 
originally from South Africa. Anglo American and BHP have shifted their 
headquarters to the UK and Australia, respectively, after the end of apartheid. 
Both of them, as all large and medium-sized companies considered in this 
article, are listed on international stock exchanges in London, New York 
and/or Toronto. 
 
The two sectors comprise a significant number of foreign as well as 
local companies with or without brand names, catering to different market 
segments within South Africa. The firms we analyze also differ in size and 
are exposed to varying pressure from NGOs and foreign competition. 
Comparing their CSR engagement and contribution to environmental 
protection and the fight against HIV/AIDS in different localities allows us to 
explore the impact of functional equivalents to a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast 
by the South African state. 
 
Functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
 
The cases of multinational automotive and mining companies in South 
Africa clearly show that there are functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’. Reputational costs and benefits linked to the protection of a brand 
name and yielded by the higher market value of products, respectively, as 
well as pressures by NGOs, foreign competitors and their country of origin 
induce MNCs to engage in CSR activities that contribute to environmental 
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protection and the fight against HIV/AIDS. We also find support for the 
‘shadow of anarchy’.  
 
To illustrate the effects of reputational concerns, we analyze two 
automotive firms that target a premium segment of the consumer market and 
one firm that focuses on the mass market (Thauer 2010).3 The difference in 
the target market is reflected in the fact that the firms aiming at the premium 
market sell their products at higher average prices than the one firm targeting 
a mass market. Managers of the two high-end market firms stated in addition 
that they rely less on economies of scale than other automotive firms 
targeting low-end markets, and are able to add mark-ups to end-prices.4 The 
difference in the target market is further reflected in the importance of 
consumer expectations. Especially as regards quality, the two high-end 
market firms are faced with much higher consumer expectations5 than the 
mass-market firm.6 Hence, they are more vulnerable in this respect. 
Moreover, the high-end market producers stated that they do not perceive 
themselves as competitors of the low-end market firm. That is, they do not 
operate in the same consumer markets. Hence, our analysis features two firms 
that are particularly affected by reputational losses as well as reputational 
gains, and one firm less driven by reputational concerns. 
 
How do these differences impact upon the CSR related governance 
contributions of the three firms? We find a variation in the extent of self-
regulation of the three automotive producers.7 The differences, however, 
occur at a relatively high level of regulation: All three automotive 
manufacturers apply high levels of self-regulation as regards strictness of 
rules and the resources allocated to implement these rules. All three firms 
                                                 
3
 We chose the three cases as they are highly similar in all important aspects except for the 
factor ‘brand name / target market’. Thus, this case selection allows us to evaluate the 
isolated effects of different intensities of reputational concerns on CSR policies of MNC. 
4
 Interviews with the corporate affairs manager and the public communications 
manager/high-end market firm 1 (anonymized), Munich, 02 August 2007; telephone 
interview with the director of public affairs and policy/high-end market firm 2 
(anonymized), 06 August 2007. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Interviews with the corporate social responsibility manager, the corporate affairs manager 
and the environmental manager/low-end market firm (anonymized), Rosslyn, 14 February 
2007. 
7
 The following draws on information from the interviews with the environmental manager 
and the corporate planning manager/high-end market firm 1 (anonymized), Rosslyn, 20 
February 2007; the interviews with the corporate affairs manager and the public 
communications manager/high-end market firm 1 (anonymized), Munich, 02 August 
2007; the interview with the occupational health and corporate social responsibility 
manager/high-end market firm 2 (anonymized), East London, 26 February 2007; the 
telephone interview with the director of public affairs and policy/high-end market firm 2 
(anonymized), 06 August 2007; the interviews with the corporate social responsibility 
manager, the corporate affairs manager and the environmental manager/low-end market 
firm (anonymized), Rosslyn, 14 February 2007. 
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operate ISO 14001 and ISO 9001 certified management systems. These 
systems come to bear within a firm and within the supply chain (Héritier et al. 
2009). All three producers request both kinds of management systems from 
their first tier suppliers: ISO 14001 is an environmental management system; 
ISO 9001 is a quality management system with environmental components. 
These two certification schemes demand a high level of standards, 
independent legal compliance audits and certificates. Since South African 
environmental legislation is quite demanding as regards formal provisions 
(even though implementation is not satisfactory) this means that the 
environmental policies of the three manufacturers are quite strict. Moreover, 
the implementation of self-regulation is subject to an auditing process and 
systematic control. Non-compliance is sanctioned by non-certification. In 
other words, the certification schemes not only provide for monitoring, but 
also for enforcement. 
 
Beyond these similarities in the application of ISO certified 
management systems, there are also some differences in the self-regulation of 
the three firms. The high-end market producers operate, in addition to the ISO 
management systems, particularly strict and demanding in-house 
environmental and quality management systems. These systems are company-
specific and prescribed by their global headquarters. As regards the degree to 
which rules are demanding, their scope and strictness, they go beyond both 
the standards of the ISO management systems and of South African 
legislation. In fact, these specific in-house systems require full compliance 
with all relevant European environmental process and product regulations and 
even go beyond European legislation. The mass producer, on the other hand, 
in addition to the ISO certified systems, also provides its own in-house 
policies. These policies are, however, less strict when compared to the 
premium producers. Moreover, the mass producer’s practice focuses almost 
exclusively on quality standards, rather than requiring more stringent 
environmental self-regulation.  
 
In sum, the self-regulatory standards of the mass producer are less 
demanding than those of the premium producers. This difference, however, 
only exists with respect to in-house self-regulation. Self-regulation with 
respect to the supply chain is very similar in all three firms: all automotive 
manufacturers only require ISO certified management systems from their first 
tier suppliers.  
 
One possible explanation for this finding is that a similar and 
standardized approach in the supply chain guarantees ‘vertical compatibility’ 
(Farrell 2007: 378). It decreases the degree to which large automotive buyer 
firms are dependent on specific suppliers, thereby reducing the risk of 
becoming victims of ‘hold ups’ and excessive rent seeking behavior in their 
relationship with suppliers (Héritier, et al. 2009; Farrell 2007). Next to the 
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effects of reputational concerns on companies, this finding also illustrates our 
argument that ‘race to the top’ dynamics (Vogel and Kagan 2004) with 
respect to voluntary standards can take place in areas of limited statehood, if 
the adoption of standards yields economic gains. 
 
While such ‘race to the top’ dynamics (Vogel and Kagan 2004) 
certainly contribute to environmental governance in South Africa, they may 
have adverse effects on the governance of other issue areas, such as 
competition and social policy. Raising the level of standards in an industry 
sector always means that competitors that do not meet these standards are 
kept out of the market (Greenstein and Stango 2007). A striking example in 
this respect is the South African association of automobile manufacturers 
(NAAMSA), which successfully lobbied the South African government to 
issue stricter environmental regulation to keep low-regulating competitors 
from China, India and South America and their cheaper cars out of the South 
African market (Thauer 2010). More precisely, the association – driven by 
European, Japanese, and German originating mass market producers – feared 
an entrance of cheap Chinese and Indian cars on the South African car market 
and therefore pressed the government to issue stricter regulations with respect 
to emissions of new vehicles.8 In response to this lobbying attempt, the South 
African government raised the level of emission regulations as requested by 
NAAMSA, so that the cheap car competitors could not sell cars legally on the 
South Africa market.9 Mobility is a prime social issue in South Africa, and the 
lack thereof a main barrier to employment for people who live in remote 
townships far away from the industrial centres. Keeping cheap cars out of the 
market may thus be regarded not only as an obstacle to free trade, but also as 
hampering enhanced mobility and an inclusive labor market. Hence, this 
example demonstrates that raising standards may involve trade-offs – in this 
case between, on the one hand, an enhanced environmental protection and, on 
the other hand, enhanced mobility and free markets. 
 
Unlike in the automotive sector, end-consumer markets do not play a 
role in the case of most mining companies as most industrial and precious 
metals are traded at the London Metals Exchange or are sold on the basis of 
                                                 
8
 Cf. Cokayne, Roy 2008: “McCarthy Adds Cheap Chery Range”, in: Business Report, 12 
May 2008: www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=563&fArticleId=4397598 (last 
accessed 11 June 2011); interview with the chairperson of the fuel and emissions 
committee of NAAMSA who also serves as the environmental and industrial planning 
manager of a low-end market firm/NAAMSA and low-end market firm 1 (anonymized), 
Rosslyn, 20 February 2007; interview with the occupational health and corporate social 
responsibility manager/high-end market firm 2 (anonymized), East London, 26 February 
2007. 
9
 Consumers would have to buy these cheaper cars illegally – which would have severe 
negative consequences in case of liabilities and their warranties. Hence, in the case of 
emissions standards regulations are self-enforcing (and thus do not require effective state 
enforcement in order to be effective). 
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bulk contracts to governments and large companies. Yet, end-consumers do 
play an important role in one special case, namely in the diamond mining 
industry. We have argued that the reputation of a company and the loyalty of 
its clients constitute a key corporate asset and can earn a premium for 
‘socially responsible’ products. Such companies are, at the same time, 
particularly vulnerable to campaigns that undermine their reputation. Clearly 
a luxury good for the upper-end consumer market, people attach emotional 
values to the stones taking them as a symbol for purity. That image was 
successfully put at risk by the campaign against blood diamonds that accused 
large companies such as De Beers and other traders of precious stones to buy 
and sell stones from conflict regions. De Beers is engaged in the production, 
trading and selling of diamonds and this campaign threatened the company’s 
brand as well as the image of the product itself. In reaction, De Beers joined a 
certification system for diamonds, the Kimberley Certification System set up 
in 2003.10  
 
De Beers’ engagement in governance in this case cannot only be 
traced to social mobilization and concerns over reputational costs. By the 
time of the blood diamond campaign, the company was losing market shares 
to smaller traders. De Beers saw the certification scheme not only as a tool for 
regaining consumer confidence, but also as a way of keeping new traders out 
of the market and regaining its earlier dominant market position (Paes 2005, 
Kantz 2006). This case supports our argument that brands gain a competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis competitors if they engage in strict collective regulation.11 
 
The De Beers case stands out from other mining companies 
concerning the role of consumer confidence. However, the mining industry in 
general provides clear evidence for our argument that campaigns by 
transnational NGOs and local community-based organizations against 
violations of CSR norms can impose reputational costs on companies. These 
do not need to work through consumers’ shopping decisions. The public 
shaming of companies may as well result in falling stock market prices and 
shareholder criticism. Mining companies under attack have sought to pacify 
critics through the adoption of high self-regulatory standards and an ostensive 
commitment to CSR (Hönke and Kranz forthcoming). Among the companies 
operating in South Africa, large global companies such as BHP Billiton and 
Anglo American, and companies that were targeted by a human rights 
campaign, such as Anglogold Ashanti (AGA), take the lead in the Social 
                                                 
10
 See www.kimberleyprocess.com/ [last accessed 25 June 2011]; cf. Kantz 2006; Paes 2005. 
11
 The Kimberley scheme involves states so that some may argue that it should not be seen as 
a functional equivalent to the state. That would be a misunderstanding of our argument. 
We hold that social mobilization and market incentives served as functional equivalents 
to the state’s ‘shadow of hierarchy’ in making De Beers engage in governance with 
regards to its operations in areas of limited statehood.  
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Responsibility Index of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.12 While the 
medium size company Anglogold Ashanti comes second in the 2010 ranking, 
other small and medium-sized companies score less well.  
 
Many of the smaller companies operating in South Africa, however, 
are ‘followers’ at best, or do not participate in the discourse at all. An 
increasing number of medium and small mining enterprises have emerged in 
the course of the industry’s restructuring process. They are mostly 
subcontracting firms supplying technical assistance and machinery or 
exploratory services to larger companies. They do not have the historical 
legacy of apartheid complicity and are much less visible and thus are not 
likely to be targeted by transnational campaigns. They populate the more risk-
friendly business segment of the mining industry (Szablowski 2007, 
Malherbe 2000).
13 
Anglogold Ashanti is an exception in this regard. The 
medium-sized gold mining company has become a leader in engaging in 
human rights and security-related CSR.14 This can be traced back to a major 
campaign against the firm’s operations in Eastern Congo. AGA was accused 
of complicity with the rebel group FNI15 who used to control the region in 
which it holds its concession. The case became central to international NGO 
campaigns urging regulation against companies fuelling conflict.16 Other 
medium-sized companies, such as Goldfields or FQML, do not engage in 
governance as much. They have not been targeted by shaming campaigns.17  
 
We also find ostensive sector-wide governance activities by mining 
companies. This is in line with our argument that pressure to engage in CSR 
can also emanate from peers who are concerned that ‘one rotten egg spoils the 
                                                 
12
 See www.jse.co.za/Products/SRI.aspx and the 2010 ranking: www.jse.co.za/About-
Us/SRI/Results/2010Results.aspx (last accessed 12 June 2011). 
13
 Interview with the deputy directors environment/DME, Pretoria, 27 March 2007; interview 
with a consultant and lecturer/School of Mining Engineering at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 20 March 2007; interview with the environmental 
manager/BHP Billiton, Witbank, 26 November 2007. 
14
 AGA ranks second on the high-impact industries best-performers list of the Sustainable 
Investment Index 2010 of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, www.jse.co.za/About-
Us/SRI/Results/2010Results.aspx (last accessed 20 June 2011). The company has become 
a member of the VPs in 2007. See AGA’s global security strategy and the reporting on 
the VPs: www.anglogold.co.za/Sustainability/Other+public+reports/ (last accessed 28 
June 2011). Interviews with the manager community relations and social 
development/AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., Johannesburg, 3 October 2007. 
15
 Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI). 
16
 HRW 2005. 
17
 Both are not members of the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights. Internal 
policies on security and human rights are weak and/or little implemented in practice (see 
www.goldfields.co.za/sus_reports.php and http://www.first-
quantum.com/s/Social.asp?ReportID=134525 (last accessed 25 June 2011)); interview 
with a manager/Golf Fields Protection Services, Johannesburg, 29 November 2007; 
interview with the regional security manager/FQML, Ndola, 26 October 2007. See also 
Hönke forthcoming-b. 
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entire cake’, i.e. the reputation of an industry sector. Why should companies 
go beyond implementing individual standards to restore their reputation in 
response to a campaign? Reputation in the mining industry – and the level of 
threat of regulation – is often not company-specific but a collective issue 
(Hönke forthcoming-b, Szablowski 2007, Hönke and Kranz forthcoming; 
Prakash 2005). This points to our argument that the threat of external 
regulation (external ‘shadow of hierarchy’) is another functional equivalent to 
the state’s ‘shadow of hierarchy’. The mining industry has faced extensive 
criticism for its negative impact on the environment, especially in developing 
countries. Extractive industries are high-impact industries: they leave a large 
negative footprint on the local environment and often have detrimental effects 
on social relations and security (negative externalities). In addition, they 
extract non-renewable resources and are thus an extremely unsustainable 
industry. There is a particularly high number of transnational campaigns (e.g. 
PWYP, by GW, HRW, Friends of the Earth etc.) and regulatory attempts of 
the industry (see in particular the debate about the UN Norms until 2003, 
initiatives for home state regulation in the UK, Canada, the EU, the US).  
 
While smaller companies can free-ride on the positive image produced 
by CSR-activities of major companies, the entire sector suffers reputational 
damage when any mining company in any country gets under fire. This 
damage in many instances materializes in a decline in credibility in the 
financial markets and in a looming threat of stricter regulation by states that 
have the necessary enforcement capacities. In order to counter increasing 
public pressure, the industry has come up with a number of initiatives, not 
only at the company level, but also in the form of collective business 
responses at the transnational level. There are a number of transnational, 
sector-specific CSR initiatives.18 In 1999, for instance, nine of the largest 
mining companies closed ranks to form the Global Mining Initiative (GMI), 
presenting the industry as committed to environmental principles and 
standards. In preparation of the World Summit of Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg 2002, a comprehensive consultation and research program was 
initiated; the Mining/ Metals and Sustainable Development process (MMSD). 
It resulted in the development of state of the art sustainability policies within 
the industry, amongst others in the Southern African region. The International 
Chamber of Mines and Metals (ICMM) was created to coordinate the 
approach of the industry’s global players towards issues such as 
sustainability, human rights or social development. It developed a common 
global reporting standard for the industry, the Sustainable Development 
                                                 
18
 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2007), Kimberly Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS 2007), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI 
2007), Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA 2007), International Council 
on Mining & Metals (ICMM 2007). 
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Framework (SDF).19 Membership in the ICMM obliges companies to report 
according to the SDF framework. These developments build evidence for our 
argument that shaming campaigns do in fact prompt companies to engage in 
CSR. In addition, they can unleash market pressure and increase the threat of 
state regulation for an entire industry, inducing mining companies to engage 
in sector-wide governance initiatives.  
 
We also find support for the ‘shadow of anarchy’, the third functional 
equivalent to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. The South African automotive 
industry strongly relies on skilled labor and heavily invests in the training of 
employees. These investments, however, are threatened as a consequence of 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa. Estimations are that between 15-20 
per cent of the population in the sexually active age group has contracted the 
virus.20 Sick leaves, lower productivity, and social conflict associated with the 
disease can undermine the profitability of the investment in skills. Empirical 
studies have shown that this risk is a sufficient incentive for firms that invest 
substantial resources into the training of employees to engage in HIV/AIDS 
workplace programs and comprehensive health care provision (Thauer 2010, 
2012).  
 
In addition to such in-house workplace programs, automotive firms 
also reach out to the industry as a whole and to state institutions to contribute 
to a generally healthier labor force in the country.21 More specifically, 
Mercedes Benz in East London, VW and General Motors in Port Elizabeth 
and Uitenhaage, BMW on the outskirts of Pretoria as well as Toyota in 
Durban run projects with local as well as nation-wide business associations 
and local public health institutions (schools, clinics, hospitals) that are 
directed at raising  awareness of the disease in the population, publicizing 
preventive measures such as condom use, and improving health care services 
for those who have contracted the virus (for example, through the training of 
nurses and doctors in local clinics on the specifics of HIV/AIDS treatment). 
Why do these firms engage in public health care provisions and programs that 
reach out far beyond their own workforce?  
 
In line with our argument about the ‘shadow of anarchy’, the business 
model of these companies heavily features the provision of public health. As 
the state in South Africa proves neither willing nor capable of addressing the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic effectively, these companies decided to organize the 
                                                 
19
 Following the MMSD process, the former transnational mining association ICME was 
transformed into the ICMM, charged with carrying forward the GMI agenda. See 
www.icmm.com (last accessed 5 January 2011) for further details. 
20
 According to Unicef “estimated adult prevalence rate (aged 15-49) in 2007 is 18.1 per 
cent”. www.unicef.org/infobycountry/southafrica_statistics.html (last accessed 5 January 
2011). 
21
 Ibid. 
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production of this common good by themselves, not only individually but 
also collectively. On the global level, many of these companies engage in the 
World Economic Forum Global Health Initiative (GHI) and the Global 
Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases.22 
Nationally, they work with the South African Business Coalition against 
HIV/AIDS (SABCOHA), Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) and 
NAACAM, the National Association of Automotive Component 
Manufacturers, which organizes the suppliers of these big MNCs. On the 
local level, where their main focus of activities lies, companies initiate many 
projects with local chambers of commerce. All of the major South African car 
companies are actively involved in association work on the issue of 
HIV/AIDS. Associations help them push workplace programs onto their 
supply chains, which they usually share. Hence, the reason for coordination in 
associations is efficiency gains rather than mitigating free-rider problems. 
 
The case of mining is similar in the sense that De Beers, Anglo 
American and others have been pioneers in fighting HIV/AIDS beyond the 
workplace. Yet, the reasons for this engagement are different from those of 
the automotive industry. Trade unions played a key role in pushing 
companies towards adopting a comprehensive and non-discriminatory 
HIV/AIDS policy in the South African mining industry (Hönke forthcoming-
a). Having identified HIV/AIDS as an economic risk as early as the 1980s, 
the mining industry initially enacted a discriminatory policy and excluded 
infected employees. Opposed by the labor movement, which has been a close 
political ally of the ANC, the new ANC government interdicted such 
practices.  Post-apartheid labor regulation in South Africa effectively changed 
the cost calculation of firms in the field of health: newly designed labor 
regulations now prohibit mandatory testing and automatic dismissal due to an 
HIV infection. Furthermore, companies are bound to guarantee the same 
pension and home-based care benefits to early retired HIV-positive workers 
and dependents of deceased workers as to everybody else (Mahajan et al. 
2007). In 1991, companies signed an agreement with the National Union of 
Mineworkers; in 2003 another agreement between the Chamber of Mines and 
the trade union guaranteed health care arrangements for dependents. Overall, 
public pressure, normative change and reputational concerns were crucial 
incentives for mining firms to tackle the issue of HIV/AIDS. Reputational 
concerns in this regard are connected to the widespread negative perception 
of mining companies in South Africa, which is not only related to the 
companies’ discriminatory behavior in the past. Rather, their migrant labor 
system is seen as a major cause for the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Southern 
                                                 
22
 Interview with CEO/NAAMSA, Pretoria, on various occasions in 2007; interview with 
CEO/NAACAM, Johannesburg, September 2008; interviews with CEOs and production 
managers of various suppliers, Rosslyn, Brits and Bellville, March and September 2007; 
interview with automotive expert, Durban, October 2007. See also www.naamsa.co.za 
(last accessed 5 January 2011) for reports. 
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Africa (Fourie 2006). Cross-functional engagement in development and 
health programs that address the pandemic is a response to these concerns.  
 
Overall, the rationale of companies for taking collective action on the 
problem of HIV/AIDS is highly problem-oriented. Fighting HIV/AIDS and 
thus contributing to public health is a highly coupled task and cannot be 
fulfilled by companies alone. The employees of the companies we analyze 
live their private lives outside the factory gate. This private sphere, in which 
employees confront the greatest risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, lies beyond 
the control of any individual company. Workplace programs alone are thus 
not sufficient to address the problem of HIV/AIDS. It takes collective action 
within associations, but also with state agencies and NGOs.  This finding 
partially disconfirms the causal logic of our ‘shadow of anarchy’ argument. 
However, it is, in line with the argument that the solution of   complex tasks 
requires a minimum of statehood (see below). 
 
The collission of limited statehood and governance  
 
The case of the automotive industry demonstrates that while 
functional equivalents can make MNCs engage in CSR, it still requires the 
involvement of the state for CSR to contribute to governance. Where 
companies are not particularly concerned about reputational losses – for 
example, because they lack a brand name – the state becomes an addressee of 
the demands of transnational advocacy networks to put political pressure on 
companies to change their behavior. The case of a Cape Town-based large 
chemical fibre producer for the tyre industry is illustrative in this respect.23 In 
the 1990s, the firm was heavily polluting the environment and surrounding 
neighborhoods suffered heavily from industrial fallout, effluents, uncontrolled 
hazardous waste disposition and emissions. Local neighborhood 
organizations stood up against this kind of unrestrained pollution, and teamed 
up with other NGOs and support groups (Héritier et al. 2009). The resulting 
public ‘shaming’ campaign alone, however, did not have much impact on the 
fibre company since it does not have any end-consumer business. 
Recognizing their failure, the NGOs changed their strategy and re-directed 
their pressure to local members of parliament and to the municipality, 
demanding state authorities to regulate the company more effectively. The 
company had existed in Cape Town already before most of the relevant 
environmental regulations were in place. Hence, changes could not simply be 
legally forced upon the company, but had to be negotiated. The state 
delegated negotiations back to the NGOs, but remained in the background, 
threatening the company with new (applicable) regulation or a generally 
unfriendly business environment, should it not engage constructively in the 
                                                 
23
 Interviews with the managing director, a union representative, the environmental manager 
and various floor managers/chemical fiber producer (anonymized), Bellville, 30 March 
2007; interview with a Manager/TEXFED:, Johannesburg, 21 March 2007. 
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negotiations with the NGOs. This ‘shadow of hierarchy’ helped to bring 
about the Belleville Environmental Forum, which is considered to be a model 
of dealing with environmental conflicts in South Africa.24  
 
The Belleville Environmental Forum resolved the conflict of the firm 
with the local NGOs. Through the negotiations, the firm gradually reduced its 
pollution level up to the point that it is now in the process of ISO 
14001certification. Moreover, interactions within the forum changed over 
time. While participants describe the atmosphere as overtly hostile in the 
beginning, the parties to the negotiation warmed up to each other over time 
and some unusual alliances were formed.25 Having implemented many 
changes in its production processes, the firm started to actively sponsor the 
forum in order to make other firms – and especially competitors – engage in 
environmental pollution reduction, too. Once again, we find that race to the 
top dynamics can be triggered even under conditions of rather limited 
statehood. 
 
The case of the automotive industry also demonstrates that a degree   
of statehood is necessary if the organization of governance is a highly 
coupled task. As shown above, automotive firms have a genuine interest in 
contributing to the fight against HIV/AIDS given their high investments in 
skills development and training. In light of the high interdependence of 
various actors in their attempt to find a solution to the problem of HIV/AIDS, 
these companies decided to reach out to the industry as a whole  via 
associations and state agencies by means of public-private partnerships to 
contribute to a generally healthier labor force in the country. Mercedes Benz 
in East London, VW and General Motors in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhaage, 
BMW on the outskirts of Pretoria as well as Toyota in Durban run projects 
with local as well as nation-wide business associations and local public health 
institutions (schools, clinics, hospitals) that are directed at raising  awareness 
of the disease in the population, publicizing preventive measures such as 
condom use and improving  health care services for those who have 
contracted the virus (for example, through the training of nurses and doctors 
in local clinics on the specifics of HIV/AIDS treatment).26 
 
Two main motivations drive firms in their attempts to strengthen 
statehood through such public-private partnerships. Firstly, they understand 
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 Ibid.. 
25
   Interviews with the managing director, a union representative, the environmental manager 
and various floor managers/chemical fiber producer (anonymized), Bellville, 30 March 
2007 
26
 Interview with the CEO/NAAMSA, Pretoria, February 2007; interview with the 
CEO/NAACAM, Johannesburg, September 2008; interviews with the health- and 
corporate affairs managers of various automotive producers, Rosslyn, East London and 
Port Elizabeth, February and September 2007; interview with an automotive expert, 
Durban, October 2007. 
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that HIV/AIDS is as much a societal problem as a disease and can therefore 
only be tackled effectively through collective action of all relevant actors. 
Secondly, in the field of HIV/AIDS abatement, weak statehood is a 
significant obstacle to private initiatives to fight the disease. HIV/AIDS 
workplace programs are highly problematic if the state cannot guarantee that 
patients will be taken care of by public health  institutions in case  a firm 
decides to let staff go or if it   moves away.27 More precisely, extending these 
programs to full antiretroviral medication provision is problematic if there is 
no medical scheme for employees who loose their job. This bears the danger 
that persons who contracted AIDS develope resistancies towards anti-
retroviral medication. 
 
The field of the environment provides further examples of the 
necessity of statehood for CSR activities that contribute to governance when 
dealing with coupled tasks. The big MNCs in the automotive industry are 
generally all ISO 14001 certified. Hence, they operate on relatively high 
environmental standards. However, ISO 14001 is in essence a management 
system which prescribes procedural rules. The level of substantive – that is, 
pollution limiting – standards in which this management system is embedded 
can vary. At a minimum, ISO 14001 requires that a company implements the 
legal prescriptions prevailing in the country where its operations take place to 
be certified. In many areas, environmental regulation is a highly complex and 
coupled task to fulfill:28 National guidelines may exist, but they have to be 
applied at the local level, and for that it takes an active state which is capable 
of setting these standards. Often, however, we find that the state is not able to 
fulfill this basic function – as, for example, in East London, where a big 
German automotive MNC was confronted with the situation that it had to 
undergo ISO 14001 certification without knowing its effluent, emission and 
waste deposition limits. As a result, certification almost failed, and the 
company found it impossible to formulate an appropriate CSR policy.29 
 
Difficulties in implementing the elaborated South African Water Act 
provide an example for how weak statehood can hinder compliance of mining 
companies with CSR. The act requires companies to reapply for new water 
licenses, which requires them to go through a complex procedure involving a 
comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment. The department’s own 
capacities have proven to be weak in dealing with the large number of 
applications combined with the ambitious requirement of the act itself. Due to 
                                                 
27
 Ibid.. See in addition the interview with the health expert/Border Kai Chamber of 
Commerce/Daimler Trust, East London, September 2007. 
28
 Certification officer/SABS (South African Bureau of Standards), 12 September 2007, 
Pretoria. 
29
 Interviews with the environmental-, the occupational health and corporate social 
responsibility managers/high-end market firm 2 (anonymized), East London, 26 February 
2007. 
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the slow bureaucratic procedures and the lack of monitoring and enforcement 
capacities of the government, mines used to operate without having a water 
license. Even though the claim of the Chamber of Mines that large companies 
were in danger of disqualification from ISO 14001 seems to be exaggerated,
30
 
the issue of legal compliance is a recurrent issue of debate during ISO 
audits.
31
  
 
Besides the need for a minimum of statehood in the host state in order 
to  successfully implement and sustain CSR that contributes to governance, 
the state also plays an important role in a number of  transnational multi-
stakeholder initiatives set up to address governance problems. The Voluntary 
Principles of Security and Human Rights (VPs) were initiated by the US and 
UK governments together with US and UK companies.32 As for the 
Kimberley process, NGOs and external state actors are instrumental in setting 
up such regulatory initiatives. Involving host states is crucial though.  
Successful implementation of the VPs requires the support of host 
governments that cooperate controlling police and military and improving 
their compliance with human rights standards (Börzel and Hönke 2011). The 
Kimberley process depends even more on a minimum of willingness and 
capacity of diamond-exporting states to implement the certification scheme. 
Participant countries are required to put in place national legislation and 
institutions to monitor the scheme.33  
 
Summing up, we find functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ that make companies engage in CSR that contributes to 
governance in areas of limited statehood. Whereas statehood can be 
substituted by other mechanisms that incite CSR activities, a limited degree 
of statehood is still required to turn these CSR activities into effective 
governance contributions. Statehood is particularly necessary when MNCs 
are immune to reputational concerns, governance tasks are coupled, and the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ is to be cast externally. 
 
The ‘dark side’ of statehood 
 
While statehood is often needed for CSR contributions to governance, 
its presence can also have the reverse effect. This is in particular the case in 
complex-task areas in which effective governance would require the co-
                                                 
30
 Interview with the environmental adviser/Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, South Africa, 
16 March 2007. 
31
 Interview with the manager sustainable development/AngloPlatinum, Johannesburg, 20 
November 2007. 
32
 See www.voluntaryprinciples.org (last accessed 25 June 2011).  
33
 See the requirements in sections II, V a and VI 8, 9 of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS), www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/basic_core_documents_en.html 
(last accessed 25 June 2011). 
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production of collective goods by business’ CSR engagement and state 
provision of services and basic infrastructure. Yet, in the complex-task area of 
HIV/AIDS the state has used its limited capacities to prevent companies from 
combatting the pandemic in South Africa . In their fight against the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in the area of Durban in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
MNCs, together with the Global Fund, the local municipality and the local 
chamber of commerce, initiated a public-private partnership for HIV/AIDS 
prevention and comprehensive treatment. It was to be rolled out throughout 
the local business world and from there on to society.34 However, the central 
government, fearing agency loss and threat to its sovereignty, insisted to take 
full control over the budget and content of the project right before it started. 
In light of the erratic stance of the then national government towards the 
pandemic and its obvious failure to respond to it effectively, its insistence on 
controlling the partnership de facto meant its ending, as it forced the partners 
of this project to withdraw. This case illustrates that in emerging markets, the 
state may be weak, unwilling or incompetent in some specific issue areas, but 
it is often still strong enough to break up governance structures on the local 
level and maintain control and authority over local governments and private 
actors. Even where statehood is more limited, such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the state does prevent companies from CSR contributions 
in salient issue areas in particular when these are considered to threaten state 
sovereignty. When Freeport MacMoRan and Anvil Mining wanted to conduct 
human rights training for the state police forces the firms worked with, a 
requirement of the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights, they 
were refused to do so. Such training was perceived by state authorities as 
undermining their authority and state sovereignty (Börzel and Hönke, 2011). 
In politically salient and contested issue areas, local private and public-private 
governance initiatives may thus be threatened by statehood. Overall, if the 
goals of CSR contributions are not in line with government position, states 
will rather obstruct than support them. 
 
Apart from an overtly destructive role of statehood in the governance 
of contested issue areas, we also find examples of ‘neopatrimonial collusion’ 
that affect the quality of governance contributions by CSR (Hönke, 
forthcoming-b; Hönke, with Thomas 2012). Fighting HIV/AIDS, MNCs in 
South Africa try to reach out to local governments. As mentioned above, 
medical treatment programs for employees presuppose an agreement with the 
local public health care institutions to take care of employees who are let go 
by the company.35 In exchange for this guarantee, MNCs usually offer to 
                                                 
34
 Interviews with CEO/Durban Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Durban Chamber 
Foundation; interviews with various health managers of automotive firms in Durban 2007 
and 2008. 
35
 Interview with the CEO/NAAMSA, Pretoria, February 2007; interview with the 
CEO/NAACAM, Johannesburg, September 2008; interviews with the health- and 
corporate affairs managers of various OEMs, Rosslyn, East London and Port Elizabeth, 
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extend their HIV/AIDS workplace program to parts of the local community. 
In East London, the government insisted on a highly exclusive deal: In 
exchange for the guarantee to take care of former employees of an MNC, the 
health department demanded  to have its own employees enrolled in the 
company’s workplace program.36 This is certainly a case where the attempt of 
a MNC to contribute to a common good was transformed by the 
government’s neopatrimonial habits into an exclusive club good. The MNC 
offered to take relatively poor persons from the neighboring townships on 
board of its program, which would have made a contribution to an improved 
local public health situation. Instead of persons who otherwise have no access 
to health care, now government officials who are relatively well off and could 
afford private insurance benefit from the program of the MNC. 
Even though ‘neopatrimonial collusion’ might be less a problem in 
South Africa than in other countries, evidence from the mining sector in the 
field of security supports the argument that at the local level of 
implementation such collusion between local administration and companies 
may lead to exclusive governance contributions. However, this process is not 
only driven by state actors (Hönke forthcoming-b). Mining companies 
concentrate state and non-state security capacities in the areas in which their 
operations are located; their in-house security services cooperate with private 
security companies and the South African police. The outcome of these 
security arrangements is, however, exclusive. Security is provided as a club 
good with negative effects on poor neighboring communities. While bound to 
common good provision, the police are drawn into such arrangements and 
concentrate their activities on lucrative cooperation with the companies. 
Companies cannot police on their own, as much as some of them would like 
to; a mine security agent explains that “[Y]ou know we were policemen and 
we knew we could do it”37, but companies are legally obliged to rely on the 
police for a number of activities, such as making arrests, taking fingerprints, 
preparing a docket and opening a case in court. Therefore there is engagement 
with the police: “You support them because you have to rely on them”.38 As 
part of their cross-functional CSR engagement in local communities, the 
mining companies engage in building the capacities of some local police 
stations to enable them to govern security in the mining area. However, they 
restrict this support to priority areas, with “those [police stations] which have 
the most direct impact on you”, and with regard to those functions “which 
you can’t do and for which you are relying on the police”.39 Mining 
                                                                                                                              
February and September 2007; interview with an automotive expert, Durban, October 
2007. 
36
 Interview with the occupational health and corporate social responsibility manager/high-
end market firm 2 (anonymized), East London, 26 February 2007. 
37
 Interview with company security manager/platinum mining company (anonymized), 
Johannesburg, 14 December 2007. 
38
 Ibid.. 
39
 Ibid. 
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companies provide material resources to these selected stations, such as 
vehicles or satellite police stations, or let them use their vehicles.
40
 Such CSR 
engagement is selective in its geographical, social and functional scope. 
Selectively building state capacities thus translates into nodes of security 
governance that provide security as a narrow club good.  
 
The consensual collusion of MNC branches with host political 
authorities also takes place with non-state actors at the subnational level and 
undermines CSR that contributes to inclusive collective goods provision in 
similar ways.41 We found evidence in the platinum mining area that is partly 
under the jurisdiction of the traditional authority of the Royal Bafokeng in 
South Africa’s North-Western Province. Impala Mining operates in this area 
in a joint venture with the Bafokeng traditional authority. Impala’s operation 
was opposed by the small community of Luka when it wanted to open a new 
shaft in the community’s neighborhood in 2003. Luka residents complained 
that they would not benefit from the mining project. Teaming up with the 
conservative leadership of the Royal Bafokeng, Impala was able to bypass 
and ignore criticism of its negative environmental impact upon the Luka 
community, which is within the Bafokeng area, just next to the mine. The 
Luka Environmental Forum that organized the protest is composed of young, 
critical, mostly non-Bafokeng members. They have been silenced and 
sidelined in the political process by Bafokeng authorities and Impala.42 This 
case illustrates that ‘neopatrimonial collusion’ can render community 
pressure ineffective and result in exclusive governance. It also shows that 
collusion took place because the protesting community was marginalized in 
the area and had no means to hold the Bafokeng authority accountable and 
responsive to its needs. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that MNCs engage in CSR activities that contribute to 
governance even in areas where the state is too weak and often also unwilling 
to provide common goods. In light of the commonly held expectation that 
firms relocate production to such areas of limited statehood precisely because 
regulation is low and enforcement is ineffective this poses an important 
puzzle: Why would firms that are committed to CSR invest in areas of limited 
statehood in the first place? 
                                                 
40
 Interviews with researcher/Business Against Crime, national office, Johannesburg, 23 
March 2007 & July 2007; interview with a local manager/auditing firm managing social 
investment projects of a mining company (anonymized), Rustenburg, 3 December 2008. 
41
 For more on subnational collusion see Hönke forthcoming-b. 
42
 Interview with Luka Environmental Committee, Rustenburg, 8 October 2008; interview 
with Rustenburg Environmental Coalition (RECO) and ex-Bafokeng-Councilor, 
Rustenburg, 9 October 2008. 
27 
 
 
We argue that investment decisions follow similar rationales as the 
engagement in CSR and governance in areas of limited statehood. Firms seek 
to make profit. Areas of limited statehood provide business opportunities, 
particularly if they host emerging economies with strong growth rates and a 
great market potential (such as the BRIC states). Having a production site in a 
country gives firms access to markets that are often protected by trade 
restrictions and also yields reputational gains with potential local costumers. 
Moreover, many MNCs had already invested in areas of limited statehood 
before they subscribed to CSR; in these and other cases operating in an area 
of limited statehood provides an important incentive to engage in CSR to 
avoid being accused of engaging in a ‘race to the bottom’. Such reputational 
concerns are crucial for making MNCs engage in CSR activities that 
contribute to governance in the normative environment of the post-cold war 
era, which has confronted especially highly visible multinational companies 
with much public attention and pressure. Extending CSR activities beyond the 
corporate purview contributing to governance in areas of limited statehood is 
subject to the same cost-benefit-calculations. Beside reputational concerns 
and competitive advantages, the absence of any state provision of governance 
and an external ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by home-country states or 
international organizations can substitute for the incentives generated by the 
threat of state intervention that is often not credible in areas of limited 
statehood.  
 
Yet, these functional equivalents to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ still 
require the involvement of the state to make MNCs contribute to the broader 
common good in many areas if CSR activities are to reach beyond the 
purview of MNCs. This is particularly the case where MNCs are immune to 
reputational concerns – the threat of state regulation is necessary to make 
companies engage in CSR providing governance. Statehood is also required 
where governance tasks are complex and coupled. 
 
At the same time, statehood may also be an obstacle rather than a 
facilitator for CSR governance contributions. While being too weak to set and 
enforce collectively binding rules for the provision of common goods and to 
provide these goods, respectively, state actors can invoke their legal authority 
to prevent MNCs from contributing to governance in contested issue areas or 
make CSR activities serve their own political and economic interests rather 
than the public good. Especially firms little concerned with reputation or 
public pressure may benefit from and encourage such behavior. These dark 
sides of statehood should caution against any conclusions that the state – if 
the capacities are given – will always make MNCs contribute to governance. 
This would reify the statist bias in parts of the governance literature that sees 
the state as the superior provider of governance (Rotberg 2003; Leibfried and 
Zürn 2005; for a critique see Brozus 2011). Unlike companies, the business of 
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the state is to produce common goods. Yet, like companies, state actors need 
to be restrained and committed to the public interest by institutions and held 
publicly accountable to comply. These institutional mechanisms are often as 
weak as the capacity of the state to provide common goods and set and 
enforce collectively binding rules in the first place. Governance requires both 
responsible states and responsible companies. For areas of limited statehood, 
the institutions to hold governments and companies responsible are 
increasingly located at the international and transnational level, where the 
states are only one group of actors, albeit an important one. 
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